Studies in Labor Markets by Stephen Ross et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Studies in Labor Markets
Volume Author/Editor: Sherwin Rosen, ed.




Chapter Title: Learning by Observing and the Distribution of Wages
Chapter Author: Stephen Ross, Paul Taubman, Michael L. Wachter
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8916
Chapter pages in book: (p. 359 - 386)11  Learning by Observing and 
the Distribution of  Wages 
Stephen Ross, Paul Taubman, 
and Michael Wachter 
It is well known that the more educated have higher earnings. There are 
several possible explanations for this fact. In the framework of the human 
capital model, education produces skills that are rewarded in the market- 
place. Of course, part of  the observed differences in earnings by educa- 
tion level may arise because the more educated are also more able, but 
such an observation is not in conflict with the human capital production 
model. However, some economists have gone beyond the observation 
that ability and earnings are correlated to argue that the only or primary 
role of  education is to signal who are the more able.' 
It is extremely difficult to distinguish between the human capital and 
signaling models based on information confined to education and its 
returns,  though  there have been  several papers on the subject  (see 
Taubman  and  Wales 1973; Riley  1978). When  one set  of  empirical 
information is not able to distinguish theories, an obvious approach is to 
test the theories against other types of information. In this paper we first 
consider what  other information  about the distribution  of  income is 
available. We summarize the human capital model explanation of these 
additional facts. We then present an alternative model based on two 
assumptions; the different skills and wage changes which occur over a 
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person’s life cycle do so because a firm monitors the worker’s perfor- 
mance on a particular job. As a consequence of monitoring, the firm may 
alter the worker’s job assignment to fit the updated evaluation of  per- 
formance. Finally, we demonstrate that the observed earnings data are as 
consistent with our model as with the human capital model. 
11.1  Background 
The multitude of empirical work over the past two decades has gener- 
ated  many results  about  the distribution  of  annual earnings and its 
evolution as people age. Some of the results which are found in nearly all 
studies include the following:’ (1) in general, average earnings increase 
with years of  schooling, quality of  schooling, and years of  work expe- 
rience; (2) the age-earnings profile slopes upward, but it does so at a 
decreasing rate; and (3) the variance of  earnings, or of  its log, is not 
invariant with respect to age. Often the variance of  the log of earnings is 
U-shaped, indicating a larger dispersion for young workers and older 
workers. Diamond, et al. (1976), however, present some evidence that 
this variance decreases continuously as people age. 
There are other empirical features which have been found in several 
studies based on specialized and as yet infrequently available samples. If 
these are substantiated in other samples, they should prove to be impor- 
tant elements in income distribution models. To begin with, the correla- 
tion between (natural log) earnings and variables such as years of school- 
ing or IQ is lowest when years of work experience is small and increases 
with experience for at least the first 7-10  years of  e~perience.~  Second, 
Lillard and Willis (1977), using a nationwide random sample, find that 
70%-80%  of the variance in annual earnings is attributable to permanent 
income and that annual fluctuations about the permanent level have a 
serial correlation coefficient of about 0.3. Also Taubman (1975) finds that 
in the NBER-TH sample, the average percentage growth rate in earnings 
between 1955 and 1969, when the men averaged thirty-three and forty- 
seven years old, respectively, is the same regardless of their 1955 earnings 
level-except for men with the very highest and very lowest income. 
Diamond, et al. (1976), using Social Security data for 1957-72,  find that 
when men are grouped by their permanent earnings level, the slopes of 
the age-earnings profiles are quite similar. Those with permanently low 
income, however, tend to reach their peak income at a slower rate. 
Recently Mincer (1974) has modified and extended the human capital 
model to explain many features of  the evolution of  the distribution of 
annual earnings as people age. Mincer’s model for earnings in year t can 
be written as 
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where Y is earnings, S is years of schooling, K is the stock of on-the-job 
training capital, and Z  is investment in on-the-job training. Both K and I 
in equation 1  would be unobserved but denominated in units of time. K 
and Z  are assumed to differ across individuals. 
Mincer explains the age profiles for natural log earnings and their 
variance  and for correlation coefficients by  changes in the level and 
distribution of  Kt and It. For example, consider the variance in In  Y,  in 
equation 2. 
(2)  2 In  Y,  = b’g + C‘d,  + 4  +  2bcu3,  K, 
-  2bU,  z, -  2CUKtZ, 
Note first that this variance need not remain constant as a cohort ages 
since components such as u& can change. Moreover equation 2 need not 
imply monotonic changes in cr2 In  Y,. Consider for example three time 
periods.  In the initial year of  working, K is zero for all workers.  In 
Mincer’s  so-called overtaking  period,  cK,  =  Z,.  Finally,  in  the  peak 
period, Z, is zero. Under certain conditions all individuals will be in the 
overtaking period and subsequently in their peak period at the same 
time. In the overtaking period, 13  In  Y,  =  b2d  In S. The variances in the 
initial period will also involve the variances and covariance terms of Z  and 
K, respectively. Depending on the size of the coefficients  b and c and the 
sign of  crszt,  crKtzt, and us,,, various age profiles for 13  In  Y, can be 
generated. 
In Mincer’s (1975) model the time coefficient of schooling  is a constant, 
b. The corresponding coefficient that would be estimated by  ordinary 
least squares could change, however, because K,  and Zt  would be omitted 
variables whose covariances with S could vary with I or age. Similarly, 
Mincer’s model would suggest that the correlation of  S with In  Y,  are 
functions of  age. 
In Mincer’s work, it is generally assumed that individuals and firms 
always know a person’s marginal product at each and every point in time, 
in each and every occupation, and with and without various training 
programs. There have been some attempts to incorporate uncertainty 
about future wages and/or marginal products into this framework using 
the expected utility approach (see, for example, Thaler and Rosen 1976; 
Levhari and Weiss 1974; Weiss 1972; and Fardoust  1978). We think, 
however, that informational uncertainty is best approached in a different 
fashion. 
A basic problem that faces firms and individuals is matching the right 
person with the right job, an issue which inherently involves uncertainty. 
This matching process is made difficult because the particular job may not 
be well defined by a firm. Even if  the job is defined, the requisite skills 
may not be easily measured in advance of  hiring workers, and may not 
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Recently economists have begun to examine in some detail how work- 
ers and firms solve this matching problem in the face of uncertainty. The 
Spence (1973) Arrow (1973) signaling  model basically argues that in some 
instances individuals invest in signals so that firms can better distinguish 
among workers of different skills. Using this information, the firm sepa- 
rates workers into categories with differing marginal products and real 
wages. Inherent in much of  this work is  the notion that if  a worker 
acquires a signal such as schooling, he is always thought of  as a better 
worker and paid the average wage in that category. To make this assump- 
tion more palatable, it is argued that poor workers do not invest in the 
signal because the investment costs are higher for these workers. 
The signaling literature appears to suggest different conclusions from 
the human capital model on two separate points. First, population-wide 
increases in investment in schooling need not lead to increases in earn- 
ings. Second, one-to-one correspondence of  real wages and marginal 
productivity in the human capital model need not hold. Even if  the signal 
is unbiased, under a range of assumptions, considerable latitude exists for 
randomness in the eventual income distribution. In models which assume 
that signals are biased, the randomness is considerably strengthened. 
In this paper we provide a somewhat different critique of  the human 
capital framework and, at the same time, of  the signaling literature. Our 
model is based on the existence of  an internal labor market in the firm. 
An important function of this market is to sort workers into jobs where 
they are most productive. To focus attention on the potential importance 
of  sorting, we shall examine a model where the only function of  the 
internal labor market is to sort workers. No on-the-job training is pro- 
vided; this is a pure ability model. In our simplified model, we show that 
we also can explain the observed empirical facts concerning age-earnings 
profiles, changes in the variance of earnings, and the movements in the 
correlation coefficients by assuming that firms unravel the uncertainties 
about the abilities of  the work force. 
In addition, our model, as opposed to the traditional signaling model, 
implies that in the long run, the distribution of annual real wages may or 
may not ever equal marginal productivities. Moreover, the distribution of 
present discounted value of real wages will not equal the distribution of 
marginal products. If  there is “incomplete” sorting, distinctions between 
marginal products and real wages will persist. If  there is  “complete” 
sorting, these differences will eventually disappear. How quickly these 
differences disappear will  affect the extent to which the present dis- 
counted value of expected lifetime earnings departs from the distribution 
of  real wages. 
11.2  A Sorting Model 
We assume that each worker comes to the firm with certain observable 
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unknown, but his characteristics permit the assignment of  a probability 
vector 
p=  <pu . . . pn>j;  7 pi=  1;  jpizO 
The number pi indicates the subjective market probability that a worker 
is of  type or skill i. A cohort of workers is defined as a group of workers 
with the same signal p. Workers initially enter a firm with a p derived 
purely from external (to the firm) characteristics. Once workers are 
assigned to jobs, the vectorp is altered to reflect the internal labor market 
experience of  the workers. 
The firm is defined by a job technology which describes its output as a 
function of a job structure. This job structure is the internal labor market 
of  the firm. For purposes of simplicity, we assume that the internal labor 
market is “open” in that horizontal movements across firms can occur at 
any point along the job structure. A “perfectly closed” internal labor 
market would be one where horizontal interfirm mobility was possible 
only at the time when workers are first choosing a firm. After the initial 
assignment, interfirm movement would require a “demotion” in the job 
structure matrix. 
In an open structure the firm never pays each cohort less than its 
expected marginal return. Hence, on a worker with characteristics p, 
w(P)  2  E@) 
where w(p)  denotes the wage structure. Implicit in the notation w(p)  is 
the assumption that the wage structure is functionally dependent on the 
workers’ ~ignals.~ 
At any point in time, the firm hires a group of workers. For simplicity 
we assume that these workers can be placed into a discrete number of 
categories where each category has a separate p. Clearly, the workers 
with the highest signals, e.g., the best education, will be placed in jobs 
with higher starting salaries. This follows from our assumption of  an open 
internal labor market. Each firm must pay its various cohorts a wage no 
less than E(p)  or it will lose the group. This assumes, of course, that the 
market is rational in the way it processes information on signals p. 
The basic construct of  the firm is the job ladder or matrix. Firms are 
viewed as having a technology describing the output of particular types of 
. workers across the job array. Suppose, for example, that there are  rz  basic 
types of  workers and m  jobs at which workers can be employed. The 
symbol aii will denote the (marginal) output of a worker of type i assigned 
to job j. 
If  there were no uncertainty whatsoever about the market type, and 
with constant returns (or using the marginal job matrix), then the ith 
worker or cohort would be assigned to the job j* with 
sup mgx aii =  aii*  2  aii all j. 
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Under competitive conditions, aii’  would also be the cohort’s wage. With 
uncertainty, and under the conditions discussed above, the workers in the 
cohort would receive a wage equal to their expected product. Typically, 
the exact worker type is in fact unknown, and a category is defined by 
certain educational and personal characteristics which permit only the 
assignment of  the probability vector p. 
The  expected return on a worker in this cohort in job  j then is given by 
and the firm will assign workers to the job so as to maximize this return. 
That is, given our assumption of an open internal labor market, workers 
with signal p will receive 
w@) = m,,  Pi aij 
11.2.1  Properties of  the Wage Structure 
The definition of  the wage structure permits us to establish a close 
connection between wages and jobs. More specifically, the wage struc- 
ture w(p)  contains all of  the information on the job structure aV in the 
same way as the cost function embodies information on the firm’s tech- 
nology. 
If  we think of  the job structure as representing a set A of  jobs ~EA, 
then 
w@) =  sup 7 p,ui =  sup p.a. 
aeA  ’  UEA 
Since w(p)  is a support function for the set A,  it is well known from duality 
theory that the set 
A*={aIpa~w(p)  for allpES} 
contains A. Furthermore, if  A  is closed and convex and admits free 
disposal in that some of the worker’s output can be thrown away, the set 
A* =A. Even if not, the wage structure derived from A*  will be the same 
as that from A, and, thus, information on the wage structure alone will 
not permit us to infer more about the job matrix than that A* is its convex 
hull. 
A second property about such a wage structure is that it is a convex 
function of the probability vectorp. Formally, for any two signals x and y 
w-x+-y  -sup  -x+-y  *a  (k  )-..A  (t  ) 
1 
=  -sup  (xu +  ya) 
2a~A 
1  1 
2aeA  2asA 
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=-w(x)+zw(y)  1  1 
2 
In other words, suppose an individual has a signal [1/2 1/21; that is, he is 
thought to have a 1/2 chance of being a type x worker and a 1/2 chance of 
being a type y worker. Then his wage cannot be greater than the average 
of the wages for an x worker and a y worker. Indeed, under very general 
circumstances, as shall be shown below, the wage must be lower than the 
average for x and y workers. Although this may seem paradoxical in a risk 
neutral world, it has a simple explanation which is central to the sorting 
model. Knowledge that the worker is of  type x or y will permit a more 
optimal job placement than in the 50-50 uncertain situation. For exam- 
ple, consider the job structure in figure 11.1. A worker with a signal [1/2 
1/21  will be paid a wage of 5 and placed in .I1,  In the next period, the firm 
will be able to tell whether a worker is an x or a y by whether he had 
produced 10 units of  output or zero output. With this new information, 
the worker’s signal changes to either [lo]  or [0 11. If he produced 10, he 
will be labeled an x worker, left in job 1, and paid a wage of  10. If  he 
produced 0, he will be labeled a y worker, changed to job 2, and paid a 
wage of  9. In either case, his wage increases. 
The basic proposition, however, is not that all workers have wage 
increases, but rather that the average wage increases. For example, if the 
job structure is as shown in figure 11.2, the initial wage for the cohort is 5 
and they are all placed in job 1. In the following period, the x workers 
receive a wage increase to 10 and the y workers receive a wage cut to 1. 
The average wage is 5.5 which is greater than the initial average wage. 
(The fact that 1/2 the workers are x  while 1/2 are y follows from the 
assumption that the signal is unbiased. If  this were not the case, the 
average wage could decline.) 
11.2.2  Upward-Sloping Age-Earnings Profiles 
The knowledge that the wage structure is a convex function of  the 
signals permits us to derive an important result. Even in the absence of 
Y 
Figure 11.1 
Figore 11.2 366  Steven Ross/Paul Taubmadhlichael Wachter 
any change in the intrinsic productivity of  a worker over a lifetime, the 
market’s perception of a worker’s ability tends to alter with work experi- 
ence. The job performance might reveal that a particular worker has 
been overvalued or undervalued, but on average his wage will increase 
over the worker’s lifetime.  This arises simply from the procedure of 
sorting workers over their lifetime. 
Theorem  I:  The average wage for a cohort will  rise  over time, i.e., 
age-earnings profiles rise. 
Proof:  Since we have assumed that the signal implies a probability vector 
about the true population proportion,  it is sufficient to show that the 
expected wage increases with any initial signal. Let po  be the initial signal 
and pi the random  signal  at  time  1 dependent on both p0 and  the 
information acquired in the first job. If  u0 is the initial job then 
W(p0) =  sup po  a 
aeA 
00  =p a 
Now, if  a worker is of  type i, then let Zi  denote the information such a 
worker gives in job uo,  andp’(Zi) be the probability vector for a worker of 
type  i in job uo. 
It is important to realize that we do not always have full information 
about a worker simply by observing the worker on a job. For example, 
suppose in job a, that ul =  u2 = ,  . . . , =  a,,  i.e., all workers perform the 
same. The job matrix has a column of  identical numbers. Clearly, if  the 
only information is the productivity of  the worker, then observing the 
worker in job ao  provides no additional knowledge about the worker, and 
the future signal equals 
P’(Zi)  =pl =po 
the initial signal. It is in this case, which we call “incomplete” sorting, that 
the average wage is constant over time and does not increase. 
In general, though, the market will obtain on-the-job information, and 
Z,  SZif k =  C. Now,p:(Zi)  is defined as  the probability that the worker is of 
type k, conditional on having the information Zi. At  time 0 the probability 
that a worker will be of  type k will be given by 
P:  =  F P!dli)  PP 
=  EIPLl 
Thus, p1 must be a probability vector with expected value or, for the 
cohort, average value equal top0.  This makes intuitive sense since at time 
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to ap' systematically biased fromp';  if such information were anticipated 
in a rational framework it would already be reflected in po. 
The rising age-earnings profile now follows directly from the convexity 
of  the wage function, 
Elw(P')J  2  w(Eb'1) 
2  W(P0)  9 
with strict inequality ifp' ranges over some nonlinear portion of  the wage 
structure. 
Theorem 1  verifies that the sorting, on-the-job ladder model implies 
the first stylized empirical observation of earnings profiles. This theorem 
is strikingly robust since no structure need be imposed on the job matrix. 
Sorting alone is sufficient to impart a positive slope to the age-earnings 
profile. 
It is useful to define a sorting equilibrium as occurring when all workers 
or worker cohorts hold the identical jobs in periods t + 1  as they did in 1. 
The sorting process can be in equilibrium in two situations. The first, 
which we  refer to as a complete sorting, occurs whenever  all of  the 
workers are placed optimally in the job structure. Incomplete sorting 
occurs when workers are not optimally placed, but the job structure does 
not permit further sorting. As indicated above, this results whenever a 
column in the job matrix has identical entries. 
Let the job structure be given by  figure 11.3, and suppose a type x 
worker belongs to a cohort whose initial signal ispo  =  (1/2,1/2). With this 
initial signal the cohort  will be assigned to jobJ, at which all members will 
produce 2 units and in which no information will be obtained. The x 
workers in the cohort will now produce below what they could produce in 
jobJ,. Of  course, this result depends  critically on the assumption that the 
worker knows only the initial signal po. 
Suppose, for example, that the worker knew he was a type x,  but only 
signaled po  = (1/2, 1/2). Such a worker could volunteer to work for less 
than 2 units in job Jy to prove himself a type x. Even better, the worker 
could agree to a contingent on performance contract. If he produced 3 
units in job Jy he would receive 2+  units with the remainder for the firm; 
otherwise, he would  receive nothing.  Nor  is there any moral hazard 
dilemma with such a contract. Quite to the contrary, only those who 
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knew themselves to be of  type x  would accept jobs Jy under such con- 
ditions; other workers would stay with J,.  We do encounter problems if 
we let the acceptance of  the offer alone represent a signal, for then 
wages might be paid ahead of performance which would create a moral 
hazard. We will ignore such difficulties below, and return to our initial 
assumption that firms and workers have the same perception of worker 
signals. 
11.2.3  The Diminishing Rate of  Increase 
The second stylized fact is that age-earnings profiles rise at eventually 
diminishing rates. While this hypothesis is as consistent with the job 
ladder model as with the human capital model, its derivation requires 
somewhat more structure than that required for theorem 1. 
It is tempting, for example, to argue that the incremental value from 
additional information along the job ladder must be declining, and that 
wages, therefore, while rising must do so at a diminishing rate. That is, 
the initial jobs contribute a great deal of  new information on a worker 
cohort, allowing for major revisions in  this signal p. After several job 
changes, however, the new information flow decreases so that the iri- 
crease in wages slows also. Although this is an attractive initial point, it is 
not sufficient to prove diminishing ratios of  wage growth. 
Suppose that the job ladder takes the form shown in figure 11.4,  and 
that the initialsignal isPo=  (p:,p;,p:) =  (1/2,1/3,1/6).  The highest initial 
wage is attainable by placing this group in J1. 
w(po)= max  poa 
14  Y, 4 
=po  J, 
=(1/2~5)+(1/3X5)+(1/6X 10) 
=5 5/6 
If the worker produces 10 units, then he will be identified as a type z and 
left in J1,  but if  5 units are produced he can be either a type x or y. The x 
or y workers are placed on job J2 and the z workers remain in J1.  The 
expected wage is thus 
E{w(p')}  =  (1/2 x 10) + (1/3 x 0) + (1/6 x 10) 
=  6 2/3 
J1  J2  J3 
X  5  10  0 
Y  5  0  10 
21000 
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At time 2, all of  the workers will be fully identified and placed in the 
correct job. Hence 
E(w(p2)J  =  w(p2) = 10 
The age-earnings profile increases at an increasing rate between periods 1 
and 2. It initially increases from 5 5/6 to 6 2/3, but then it jumps to 10  in the 
final period. 
This same job structure, though, can result in a concave age-earnings 
profile for a different cohort. If  the initial signal isPo=  (1/12, 7/12,4/12), 
then  the initial job is still J1, and  w@O) =  (5 X 1/12) +  (5 X 7/12) + (10 
X 4/12) =  6 2/3. In the next period 4/12 of  the workers remain in jl.  For 
those that can either be x or  y workers, the optimal second job is J3. Thus 
8/12 of  the workers  are placed  in  that  job.  Of  that  group,  1/12 are 
misplaced; they are actually X workers and hence produce 0 in J2. The 
remaining 7/12 are still in their optimal job and produce w. 
E(w(p'))  = (1/12  X 0) + (7/12 x 10) + (4/12 x 10) 
=9 1/6 
In the final period, all workers are again correctly placed and w(p2)  = 10. 
The age-earnings profile in this case does increase at a diminishing rate. 
Notice also that the job progressions are different with the two signals. 
For the workers that change jobs twice, the progression is from J1  to  J2 to 
J3. In the latter case, it is J1 to J3 to J2. 
These two examples indicate that without additional information, the 
job ladder provides no quantitative restrictions on the age-earnings pro- 
files. Furthermore, even if such restrictions were put on the job structure, 
the issue would still be unresolved. Demonstrating that a plot of earnings 
against jobs is rising at a diminishing rate is neither necessary nor suf- 
ficient for an uge-earnings profile to have the same shape. The reason is 
that the data are on uge-earnings profiles, not job-earnings profiles. 
By  way  of  illustration, consider the example where  w(po)=6 2/3, 
E{w(p')]  =  9/16,  and  E{w(p2)]  = 10. These points are plotted  in  figure 
11.5. Suppose, now, that the length of time between job changes is fixed, 
either institutionally through sensitivity rules or by  the nature of  the 
information structure of  the model. In addition, suppose that the length 
of  time for the first move is Over three times longer than that for the 
second. Figure 11.6 illustrates that the associated age-earnings profile is 
convex. 
To derive an eventual leveling off  of  the age-earnings profile thus 
requires a theory of  the rate at which job performance is generated. 
If  the bulk of  the value of  sorting occurred early in the worker's life 
span and the worker tended to remain in jobs for increasing time periods 
as the incremental value of  sorting diminished, then the age-earnings 370  Steven Ross/Paul TaubmadMichael Wachter 
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profile would level off. At the beginning, though, the shape of the profile 
would be somewhat indeterminate. If  the job structure is one which has 
equilibrium sorting within the worker’s lifetime, then the age-earnings 
profile must level off. 
The  data indicate that a cohort’s age-earnings profiles become flat early 
in the workers’ careers and that correlations of  earnings with schooling 
increase with experience for seven to ten years and then level off. These 
findings are consistent with an equilibrium sorting model view. Indeed, if 
all were fully sorted, the “increasing variance” proposition would not 
hold. 
11.3  Conclusions 
The human capital model has provided explanations of the age profiles 
of  earnings and its variance and correlation coefficients. We have shown 
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in this paper that a sequential sorting model operating in the presence of 
uncertainty can also explain all the available empirical evidence. Our 
explanation is based on the unobserved convexity of  the wage function 
over jobs for workers with expected but uncertain skills. The human 
capital model explanation is based on unobserved variables with un- 
observed correlations with measured variables. The two alternative mod- 
els have different implications for some purposes, and thus it would be 
useful to devise tests to distinguish them. 
Notes 
1. Taubman (1977) presents some evidence that the ability correlated with schooling is 
mostly though not exclusively cognitive. He also presents evidence that noncognitive skills 
(characteristics) or financing capability that flows from the family explains more of  the 
variance in earnings around age 50 than cognitive skills. 
2. We do not include the well-known fact that earnings or wage rates are not normally 
distributed. This characteristic can be explained by assuming that (unobserved) abilities are 
not normally distributed. 
3. For a recent examination using single cross-section samples, see chapters  3,4,  and 6 in 
Jencks, et al. (1979). Similar results are found in panel data. See, for example, Fagerlind 
(1975); Hauser and Daymount (1976); Taubman (1975). 
4. As Reder (1969) among others have noted, inability to know in advance a person’s 
marginal product need not invalidate theories which assume that in equilibrium, a person’s 
real wage will equal his marginal product. Reder, for example, suggests that piecework, 
percentage  commissions,  and other institutional arrangements  can be used  to reveal a 
person’s marginal product (MP) before payment is made. Yet there are many occupations 
and firms where the workers are hired for some relatively lengthy period at a fixed hourly or 
weekly wage and where a person’s MP is not known in advance though perhaps known ex 
post. 
5. Given that the wage structure is open, the worker need not stay with one firm.  For 
some purposes, it is interesting to view each job change as a change in firms. In this sense, 
the sorting model encompasses external  mobility, and it would be a simple matter to append 
a job-training  model that covers internal mobility within the firm. For a discussion of 
internal labor markets see Williamson, Wachter, and Harris (1975). 
Comment  John G. Riley 
Ross, Taubman, and Wachter (RTW)  have provided us with a useful 
framework within which to analyze on-the-job sorting. They demonstrate 
convincingly that the stylized facts linking the variance of  earnings and 
time in the work force can be explained purely as a sorting phenomenon. 
However, RTW  also make it clear that their model can explain almost 
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any earnings-experience profile, so it  is hard to visualize how  either 
cross-section or panel data might be used to distinguish their sorting story 
from the Mincerian hypothesis of  different rates of  on-the-job invest- 
ment. 
My own feeling is that it would be interesting to combine sorting with 
aspects of  on-the-job training in an attempt to explain observed differ- 
ences in earnings growth paths sometimes ascribed to “dual labor mar- 
kets.” To illustrate this point, consider figure C1  l.  l,  indicating the pro- 
ductivity of  different workers in different jobs. On-the-job training is 
introduced by making productivity in job 3 (J3)  dependent upon whether 
or not a worker spends an earlier period in job 2. 
Suppose a group with identifiable characteristics a  is known to be 
eighty percent type x and twenty percent type y.  In a two-period model it 
is easy to check that members of  this group will be placed first in J1 and 
then either held in J1 or advanced to J3.  1. Similarly a group with charac- 
teristics p which is twenty percent type x  and eighty percent type y is 
optimally placed first in J2 and then either in J1  or  J3.  2. So far this is very 
much the RTW story. However, suppose in addition that the per capita 
cost of monitoring performance on the job satisfies .6 <c< 1.2.  For such 
values of c the expected gains to  sorting out the twenty percent of type y in 
group a are outweighed by the monitoring costs. Then monitoring of this 
group will not take place, and type y will presumably become “discour- 
aged workers” and end up performing at the same rate as type x in J1. 
Opportunities for advancement are then open only to those groups with 
sufficiently favorable initial characteristics. 
It is natural, therefore, to ask what characteristics firms will  use to 
identify different groups. Educational achievement is an obvious candi- 
date, so RTW are surely incorrect in describing their sorting hypothesis 
as an alternative to the signaling hypothesis. Instead, the two hypotheses 
are complementary. 
This brings me to the discussion of  signaling in  labor  markets by 
Spence. The paper, essentially a minisurvey, provides a nice summary of 
many of  the issues. Particularly interesting is the discussion of imperfect 
signaling  and its distributional implications. However there are two issues 
whose omission is somewhat surprising. 
First, various authors (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), 
Riley (1979), and indeed Spence himself) have raised doubts about the 
viability of  signaling or “informational” equilibria. To clarify the issues 
JI  J2  J3.1  J3.2 
Y 
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involved, I shall consider a simple version of  the model described in 
section 10.3 of  Spence’s paper. Let  fn(y) be the time required for an 
individual of  type n to achieve educational level y, and let M,(y) be the 
lifetime marginal productivity of  type n discounted to the time of  exit 
from the educational system. Higher values of  n are associated with 
higher productivity. 
The present value of  lifetime productivity is then 
Taking logarithms we have 
u, =  logV,  =  logM,(y) -  rf,(y) 
Under the signaling hypothesis, firms offer workers a discounted lifetime 
income  W(y)  which  is  a function of  educational  achievement y. An 
individual of  type n then chooses y to maximize 
6, =  In W(y)  -  rt,(y) 
This is depicted in figure C11.2 for types a  and p (a<  p). For simplicity, 
time in school is shown as a linear function of educational achievement. 
Given the assumption central to signaling  that the marginal (time) cost of 
education is smaller for the more productive workers, there is an earnings 
function W(y)  such that type p chooses a higher level of y and both end up 
being paid discounted lifetime earnings equal to lifetime productivity. 
Spence’s  original work suggested that such an equilibrium was not unique 
and indeed that there existed a whole family of these earnings functions. 
It followed that two subsets of the population with identical unobservable 
characteristics, but differing in an observable characteristic such as race 
or sex, might be  in  quite different equilibria.  For example, lifetime 
earnings at every educational level might be strictly higher for one subset. 
This possibility generated a rich set of policy implications for affirmative 
action programs, etc. 
However, more recent work suggests strongly that the critical equilib- 
rium issue is not whether there are many equilibria but whether there are 
any! Consider again figure C11.2. Firms are initially offering lifetime 
earnings profiles of  W(y).  Suppose one firm then makes the alternative 
depicted offer  <j,  W>. Both type a  and type p are just indifferent 
between their old best offer and the new alternative. Moreover all those 
types n  with a  <  n  <  p strictly prefer the new offer. Whether or not such 
an offer is profitable therefore depends upon whether or not the average 
lifetime productivity of the types in this interval exceeds W.  Recently it 
has been shown that under relatively weak conditions expected profits 
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does not have the stability properties that one would wish of  an equilib- 
rium. 
However, further reflection suggests that the potential instability de- 
scribed above may not be very damaging. Note that prior to the new offer 
there is some type ti for whom 
M&)  = W@) 
Since w>  W@),  the new offer loses money on type ti and hence on all 
those types n such that ansii.  Therefore the new offer is profitable 
only on average. It can be shown that there is always a second alternative 
offer (in the shaded region of  figure C11.2) which generates profits to a 
reacting firm and losses to the firm offering <y,  W>. Essentially the 
reactive offer succeeds in skimming off  all the better workers from the 
pool attracted by <y,  W>. Recognition of such an undesirable outcome 
will then  tend to deter firms from making offers above the signaling 
profile Wb). 
While space constraints preclude discussion of the subtleties (see Riley 
1979;  Wilson 1977), it can be shown that of the family of signaling profiles 
described by Spence, only one, the Pareto dominating profile is a “reac- 
tive equilibrium.” 
I do not wish to argue that the reactive equilibrium concept provides an 
entirely satisfactory resolution of  the instability problems. However, at 
the very least  it  indicates that the  signaling hypothesis is not  easily 
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tion of  multiple equilibria does eliminate a major difference between the 
implications of  the traditional human capital model and its screening 
variant. 
This brings me finally to the second omission from Spence’s paper: the 
absence of  any discussion of  the different policy implications associated 
with the basic signaling model. (As I have already noted, there is an 
examination of the welfare implications of  imperfect signaling.) Accept- 
ing the unique reactive signaling equilibrium, I believe that the differ- 
ences are still very important, especially in the design of programs aimed 
at improving the education of  lower-income groups (see Stiglitz 1975). 
The issues are dramatized by  considering the simplest case in which 
there are only two types of  workers, type a  and type p. With perfect 
information about productivity, each type chooses a level of education to 
maximize 
InMlOt) -  4lOt) 
This is depicted in figure C11.3a with type a  choosing y,*  and type  f3 
choosing yp*. Note that type a  would prefer the education-earnings con- 
tract of  type p. Therefore if, as assumed in the signaling model, produc- 
tivity is not observable, type p must increase its education level to 9, in 
order to be  separated  out from the less able. The logarithms  of  the 
present value of lifetime income of  the two types are then v,* and i;, with 
signaling, rather than v,* and vp*. 
Now suppose funds are allocated for research into the improvement of 
educational achievement for the less able. The broken lines in figures 
C11.3a illustrate the effect of  an educational innovation which increases 
value added by the less able. In the traditional human capital model, the 
gains go to this group alone. However, with signaling, the increase in 
productivity of  type a  reduces the amount of signaling needed by type p 
and hence raises lifetime income of the latter group as well. Adoption of 
such a policy is therefore enlightened self-interest! 
A quite different result follows from the adoption of  an innovation 
which increases the rate of educational advancement of the less able. This 
is depicted in figure C11.3b. The higher rate of educational advancement 
implies a reduction in the marginal time costs of  education [f&(y)]  and 
hence an increase in the education of  type a.  If  productivity is directly 
observed, workers of  type p remain at yp* and the gains again go only to 
type a.  However, if  there is signaling, the flatter cost curve of  type a 
implies that workers of  type p must increase their education beyond jp  in 
order to be differentiated. This reduces their present value of  lifetime 
earnings. To summarize, educational signaling magnifies the potential 
payoff  to increasing value added by  the less able and diminishes the 
payoff to reducing the educational costs of this same group. In both cases 
the difference is due to first-order spillover effects which alter the income 
of  more able workers. 376  Steven RosdPaul TaubmadMichael Wachter 
Log  lifetime earnings 
1 
Log  VI 
I  I 
I  ti  I 
/ ,,- 
Figure C11.3  Human capital and Signaling Equilibria with Two Types of 
Workers 
Comment  Charles Wilson 
Among the several topics treated by Spence in his paper on educational 
signaling is the role of  contingent contracts as an alternative to education 
for screening workers. I will confine my attention to a closer examination 
of  this issue. My general thesis is that the effect of contingent contracts 
may be very sensitive to the opportunities of  the worker to borrow. In a 
world with perfect capital markets, contingent contracts are in principle 
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efficient substitutes for educational screening. When workers face an 
imperfect capital market, however, not only may contingent contracts be 
inefficient, but the same problems with the existence of an equilibrium 
associated with any self-selection model also appear. 
Contingent Contracts with Adverse Selection 
Suppose there are two types of workers both of  whom work for two 
periods. Type 1  workers are least productive and generate a marginal 
value product of  s1  in each period. Type 2 workers are more productive 
with a marginal value product of  s2>s1  in  each period. Each worker 
knows his own productivity at the beginning of  the first period. However, 
firms are unable to determine  the productivity of  a worker  until the 
beginning of  the second period. A contingent contract is a first-period 
wage w1  and second-period wage wi for i = 1, 2 which depends on the 
productivity of  the worker.  Therefore any contingent contract can be 
represented by a three-dimensional vector (wl,  w:, w;). 
Consider first the case where contingent contracts are binding on both 
firms and workers in the second period. Assuming that firms may borrow 
and lend at a fixed rate of  interest r,  they will be indifferent to hiring a 
worker if  the present value of  his productivity over the two periods equals 
the present value of  his wage payments. Therefore, a firm  just breaks 
even on a type  z worker if  w1  + (1  +  r)wi =  s1 + (1 +  r)si.  The firm’s “break- 
even” lines for each type worker, labeled B‘B’,  are illustrated in figure 
C11.4. Assume for simplicity that r =  0; then both have slopes equal to 
-  1  and pass through their respective marginal productivity points (s’,  si). 
The workers’ preferences across different combinations of  first and 
second-period  wage rates depends critically on their access to capital 
markets. Suppose that workers are able to borrow and lend at the same 
rate of  interest as firms. Then independent of their preferences between 
first and second-period consumption, they are indifferent between any 
two income streams with the same present value. In this case, therefore, 
any indifference curve for each worker has the same slope as the break- 
even line of  the firm. 
It should be apparent that under these conditions any contract (wl,  w:, 
w:)  for which (wl, w:) lies on the BIBl  line and (wl,  w?)  lies on the B2B2 
line is consistent with equilibrium in a competitive market. Firms are 
willing to pay a wage in excess of  the marginal value product in the first 
period if  the worker will accept a correspondingly lower wage in the 
second. Likewise, workers will accept a lower wage in the first period if 
they are appropriately compensated in the second period. 
Some of  this indeterminacy disappears if  we relax the assumption that 
workers may borrow at the same fixed rate of  interest as firms. Suppose a 
worker may lend at the fixed rate I  but faces a marginal interest rate 
schedule which increases with the amount he borrows. In this case, his 
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feasible bundles of first and second-period consumption depend on more 
than just the present  value of  his wages evaluated at interest rate r. 
Assuming his marginal rate of  substitution between first and second- 
period consumption is strictly decreasing, his marginal rate of  substitu- 
tion  between  first and  second-period wage  rates  will  also be  strictly 
decreasing at any combination of  wage rates  at which he chooses to 
borrow in the first period. Typical indifference curves are illustrated in 
figure C11.4. As we increase wl,  the slope becomes increasingly flatter 
(reflecting a lower marginal interest rate), until a combination of wage 
rates is  reached  at which  the  worker  no longer chooses to borrow. 
Thereafter, the curve becomes a straight line parallel to the firm's break- 
even line. 
Under these conditions, it is no longer true that an equilibrium can be 
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lower interest rate than workers, any contract which induces workers to 
borrow in the first period presents obvious arbitrage opportunities to 
firms. Competition then forces firms to “lend” to workers at the market 
rate of  interest by increasing the first-period wage to a point at least as 
large  as the workers’ desired  level of  first-period consumption.  The 
equilibrium wage contracts can be illustrated in figure C11.4. For type 1 
workers, any contract on their break-even line to the right of  s1  is an 
equilibrium; for type 2 workers, contracts to the right of  s2 are equilib- 
rium contracts. 
In general, it is difficult to enforce the terms of a contingent contract in 
the second period if  the worker can command a higher wage elsewhere. 
Therefore, let us assume henceforth that the terms of the contract in the 
second period are binding only on firms. In the second period, workers 
are free to change employers in order to obtain a higher wage. 
Consider first how this affects the worker’s preferences among differ- 
ent contracts. As long as the second-period wage is greater than the 
worker’s marginal value product, the worker has no incthtive to leave the 
firm. For these contracts, therefore, the worker’s indifference map re- 
mains unchanged. However, once the second-period wage falls below the 
worker’s marginal value product ,  its level becomes irrelevant. The work- 
er can guarantee himself a higher second-period wage by changing (or 
threatening to change) employers. Therefore, the  ..  typical indifference 
curve for a type i-worker becomes truncated at wi  =  s’.  Once the second- 
period wage falls below si,  the worker prefers any contract with a higher 
first-period wage. 
The break-even lines for the firms are also affected. Since the firm must 
pay a type i worker at least si  in the second period or lose him to another 
employer, it can never break even on a type i worker if it pays him more 
than si  in the first period. In particular, firms must lose money on type 1 
workers if w1  >sl.  Nevertheless, the firm may still break even on average 
when type 1  workers choose a contract with w1  >sl,  if  type 2 workers also 
accept the contract with a second-period wage low enough to  compensate 
the firm for its loss on the less-productive workers. The only constraint is 
that the second-period wage for type 2 workers exceeds2;  otherwise, they 
too will leave the firm in the second period. Let ui  be the proportion of 
type i workers. Then if the firm is to break even on average when w1 >  sl, 
wz must satisfy: (a) w:  >s2;  (b) (ulsl +  u2s2 -  wl) +  u2(s2 -  w2) =  0. 
This line is labeled B,B,  in figure C11.5. It starts at (sl, 2s2-s1) and 
declines with slope -  l/uz  until dj =  s2,  at which point the line becomes 
vertical. The lines labeled BiB; and B;B; are the break-even lines for 
each type individually. Each is identical to the corresponding BiBi  line up 
to wi  =  si,  at which point it also becomes vertical. 
Now consider the equilibrium for this market under the assumption 





first-period wage less than or equal to s1  is consistent with equilibrium. 
Both w: and wz  can be adjusted so that each worker obtains a contract on 
his break-even line. Furthermore, because the indifference curve of each 
worker  through  these  points  is  coincident  with  his  corresponding 
break-even line, there is no other contract which is profitable for the firm 
and preferred by this type of worker. Note that because the firm  breaks 
even on both types individually, it is not even necessary for both types to 
earn the same first-period wage. 
The requirement that w1  be less than s1  is essential, however. Other- 
wise, type 1  workers will choose that contract with the highest first-period 
wage. But in order for such a contract to break even, it must also attract 
type 2 workers to the corresponding contract on the BaBa  line. Since any 
such contract is less preferred than contracts with wllsl  on the BiBi 
line,  no type 2 work will  accept it.  Therefore  wl>sl  cannot be  an 
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In short, the restriction on feasible first-period wages resulting from the 
inability to enforce contingent contracts on workers does not present any 
serious problems if  workers have access to the same capital markets as 
firms. They are willing to accept any first-period wage if  the second- 
period wage is high enough to generate an income stream with a present 
value equal to the present value of  their marginal product. 
This conclusion changes in a fundamental way, however, when we 
reintroduce the possibility that workers face an upward-sloping marginal 
interest rate schedule. Suppose that type 2 workers will choose to borrow 
at any contract on the B;B;  line with w1  5s'.  In this case the indifference 
curve for the worker will have a slope which is steeper than the BiBi line 
at that  point.  However, in order to obtain a contract with a higher 
first-period wage, the worker must be willing to subsidize the type 1 
workers who will also choose the new contract. 
If the slope of the type 2 indifference curve is less in absolute value than 
llaz, type 2 workers will prefer to remain at a contract with w1  =sl,  as 
illustrated in figure C11.5. Consequently, the equilibrium looks no dif- 
ferent than when workers could borrow at interest rate r;  however, it will 
be less efficient. There are two distinct problems. First, if  there were no 
type 1  workers, the free rider problem associated with higher first-period 
wages would disappear and type 2 workers could obtain any contract on 
the BiB;  line yielding a higher level of satisfaction. Second, if either type 
workers' preferred consumption point on their BiBi  line requires a first- 
period wage greater than si,  another source of inefficiency  results because 
the firm no longer is able to make loans to its workers in the first period by 
increasing wl.  Any higher first-period wage becomes essentially a trans- 
fer payment when the worker leaves the firm in the following period. 
If  the slope of the type 2 indifference curve is greater in absolute value 
than l/uz where w1  =  sl,  then type 2 workers will strictly prefer a contract 
on the B,B, line with w1  >sl,  such as point c in figure C11.6. Firms who 
offer this contract attract both types of workers. Type 1  workers leave the 
firm at the end of the first period, but the second-period wage to type 2 
workers is sufficiently low so that the firm breaks even on the average 
worker. 
Is this contract then an equilibrium? It is nof a Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose some firms are offering contract c and attracting both types of 
workers. Another firm could offer a contract such as (4  with a lower 
first-period wage and a type 2 second-period wage sufficiently higher to 
attract the type 2 workers but still low enough more than to break even on 
such workers.  Note that this contract will not  attract type 1 workers 
because their second-period wage would be no higher than sl.  They 
would be sacrificing a higher first-period wage without receiving a higher 
second-period wage in return. 
This is precisely the same problem with the existence of equilibrium as 
was discovered by  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and myself  (Wilson 382  Steven Rdaul  TaubmadMichael Wachter 
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1977) in the context of  an insurance market. It can appear in any model 
with signaling  or self-selection. If one adopts the equilibrium concept that 
is employed in Wilson (1977), then point c does become an equilibrium. 
Firms do not offer a contract like (d) because they anticipate that firms 
offering (c)  will be left with only type 1  workers and consequently will 
drop the contract. Type 1  workers will then move to (d) and it will lose 
money as well. On the other hand, if  one adopts the reactive equilibrium 
concept suggested by  Riley (1979), then contract b is the equilibrium. 
Firms will not offer a contract like (c) because they fear retaliation by 
other firms who may offer contract d. 
Little  will  be gained  by  discussing in  any more  detail what is the 
appropriate equilibrium concept for this market. The issue has already 
been examined at some length elsewhere. However, a few words about 
the feasibility of contingent contracts are in order. Recall that the original 
issue was whether or not contingent contracts can replace signaling as a 383  Learning by Observing and the Distribution of  Wages 
screen  for  productive  workers. Throughout the  analysis the implicit 
assumption was that such contracts have essentially zero enforcement 
costs on firms. As a practical matter this may be a difficult assumption to 
justify. 
As I see it, the problem is not so much that firms have an incentive to 
break the contract. The short-run benefits of breaking a contract will be 
more than offset by the long-run cost to the firm resulting from its loss of 
credibility. The  problem is in verifying that the firm is in fact fulfilling the 
contract. It is not sufficient that the firm actually pay high-productivity 
workers  a  higher  wage  in  the  second period;  they  must  be  able to 
convince new workers that they are actually following this policy. An 
obvious solution to this problem is the use of credentials, either formal or 
informal. In order to receive a higher wage in the second period, the 
worker must satisfy certain public criteria. But this “solution” may not be 
without its own inefficiencies. In fact, we may have essentially reintro- 
duced signaling into the second-period wage decision. Insofar as workers 
overinvest in credentials which certify their productivity (in the academic 
market, they may publish too many papers or attend too many profes- 
sional meetings), the solution may be no more efficient than if  education 
were used as a signal in the first place. 
In a more complete model, I suspect that education before the first 
period would simply supplement other “credentials”  the worker must 
acquire in order to receive a higher wage in the second period. Thus, we 
have come full circle. In searching for contracts which  avoid the in- 
efficiency of  educational signaling, firms may require signaling in other 
forms and in fact may even require educational signaling to enforce the 
contracts. 
The Ross-Taubman-Wachter (RTW) paper presents a convincing and 
elegant explanation of many of the properties of the typical age-earnings 
profile. They focus exclusively on the implications for the distribution of 
earnings when firms optimally assign their employees to jobs based on the 
workers’ performances at earlier jobs. I will confine my comments to two 
points. The first is that the argument may be strengthened if  one takes 
into account the incentives for intertemporal maximization of  a worker’s 
output. The second is that when contingent contracts cannot be intro- 
duced efficiently, the problem of adverse selection may tend to generate 
some inefficiency in the assignment of  workers. 
RTW argue that depending on the distribution of the worker’s produc- 
tivity and the types of jobs available, incomplete sorting may result. This 
has the effect of  flattening the experience-earnings profile. Although I 
believe their point  is  essentially correct, the bias toward  incomplete 
sorting is less severe if  firms and workers consider the future benefits of 
less productive jobs at the beginning of  worker careers, followed by  a 
more effective sort later on. 
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by the matrix in figure 11.3. If each worker has a .5 probability of being an 
Xory  worker, the expected payoff from assigning a worker to job 1  is 2; 
for job 2 the expected payoff is 1.5.  Therefore all workers will be assigned 
to  job 1. From this example RTW  conclude that complete sorting may not 
occur even though total output could be increased if type Xworkers  could 
be identified and assigned to job 2. 
This conclusion changes, however, if  we consider the implications for 
intertemporal maximization of a worker’s output. Suppose each worker 
works three periods  and the discount rate is zero. If  all workers are 
assigned to job 1  in each period, then total output is 6 per worker. But 
firms can do  better than this. If  they assign each worker to job 2 in period 
1, the average return is 1.5; however, this permits them to identify each 
worker’s type. In the next two periods, therefore, type Xworkers can be 
assigned to job 2 and type y workers assigned to  job 1,  yielding an average 
output of  5 which, added to 1.5 in the first period, gives a total of  6.5. 
Assuming firms pay workers their expected marginal product  in each 
period, workers will choose to  work for a wage of  1.5  in the first period for 
a chance to obtain a higher wage in later periods. 
Now suppose that workers know their productivity before they take 
their  first job. If  contingent contracts can be enforced, then type X 
workers will immediately choose job 2 and type y workers job 1. In the 
absence of  contingent contracts, however, some inefficiencies appear. In 
each period, the workers in each job are paid their expected marginal 
product. Type Xworkers will immediately go to job 2 in order to  establish 
their productivity.  Type y workers will go to the job which pays the 
highest wage. This will be job 2 unless some type y workers take that job 
lowering its expected marginal product to 2. Consequently one-third of 
the type y workers will also take job 2 in period 1. In the following period 
all workers are perfectly sorted. The firm does not achieve a first best 
optimum, but does do better than it would if workers had no information 
at all. 
This result need not be obtained in general. Suppose that in job 1,  type 
X workers produced 3 units and type y workers 2, but individual output 
could not be distinguished. Output would be maximized by leaving all 
workers in job 1. But, the equilibrium  with  adverse selection would 
remain unchanged with one-third of  the type y workers assigned to job 2 
in period 1. 385  Learning by Observing and the Distribution of  Wages 
References 
Arrow, K. “Higher Education as a Filter.” Journal of  Public Economics, 
July 1973. 
Diamond, P., et. al. Appendixes in Report to Congressional Research 
Service by Consultant Panel on Social Security, August 1976. 
Fagerlind, I. Formal Education and Adult Earnings. Almqvist and Wick- 
sell, 1975. 
Fardoust, S. “Risk Taking Behavior, Socioeconomic Background, and 
Distribution of  Income: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of  Pennsylvania, 1978. 
Hauser, W., and Daymont, T. “Schooling, Ability, and Earnings: Cross 
Sectional Findings 8 to 14 Years After High School Graduation.” 
Center for Demography and Ecology, University of  Wisconsin, 1976. 
Jencks, C. “Who Gets Ahead.” Basic Books, 1979. 
Levhari, D., and Weiss, Y. “The Effect of  Risk on the Investment in 
Human Capital.” American Economic Review, December 1974, pp. 
950-63. 
Lilliard, L., and Willis, R. “Dynamic Aspects of  Earnings Mobility.” 
Econometrica, forthcoming . 
Mincer, J. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. Columbia University 
Press, 1974. 
Reder, M. “A Partial Survey of the Theory of  Income Size Distribution,” 
in  L. Soltow, ed., Six Papers  oh  Size  Distribution  of Income  and 
Wealth. Columbia University Press, 1969. 
Riley, J. “Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis.”  Rand Cor- 
poration, mimeo., 1978. 
-.  “Informational Equilibrium.” Econometrica 47 (1979): 331-60. 
Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz, J. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: The Economics of  Imperfect Information.” Quarterly Jour- 
nal  of  Economics 90 (1976): 629-49. 
Spence, M.  Market Signalling: Informational  Transfer in  Hiring  and 
Related Processes. Harvard University Press, 1974. 
~.  “Competition in Salaries and Signalling Prerequisites for Jobs.” 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics 90 (1976): 51-75. 
Stiglitz, J. E.  “The Theory of  Screening, Education and the Distribution 
of  Income.” American Economic Review 65 (1975): 283-300. 
Taubman, P. Sources of  Inequality of  Earnings. North-Holland,  1975. 
-.  “The Relative Influence of  Inheritable and Environmental Fac- 
tors and the Importance of  Intelligence in Earnings Functions.” IEA 
Conference Paper, Nordwijk, 1977. 
Taubman, P., and Wales, T. “Higher Education, Mental Ability, and 
Screening.” Journal of  Political Economy, JanuarylFebruary 1973. 386  Steven RodPaul TaubmadMichael Wachter 
Thaler, R., and Rosen, S. “Estimating the Value of a Life,” in Terleckyj, 
ed., Household Production  and Consumption. Columbia University 
Press, 1976. 
Weiss,  Y.  “The  Risk  Element  in  Occupational  and  Educational 
Choices.” Journal of  Political Economy, NovembedDecember 1972, 
pp. 1203-13. 
Williamson, 0.;  Wachter, M.  L.; and Harris, J. “Understanding the 
Employment Relation: An Analysis of  Idiosyncratic Exchange.” Bell 
Journal of  Economics, Spring 1975, pp. 250-78. 
Wilson, C. “A Model of  Insurance Markets with Incomplete Informa- 
tion.” Journal of Economic Theory 16 (1977): 167-207. 